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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROBERT SIEGWARTH and SHARRI SIEGWARTH, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents 
and 
GUIDO ARMAND and SANDRA ARMAND, 
Plaintiffs/Cross-Respondents 
v. 
Supreme Court No. 39445-2011 
EDWARD FELSING and LINDA FELSING, EDWARD BLANCHETTE and DEBRA 
BLANCHETTE, and MICHAEL SCHADEL and ROSEMARY SCHADEL, 
Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants 
and 
OPPORTUNITY MANAGEMENT CO., INC. 
Defendant/Respondent 
CROSS-APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Kootenai County, Honorable 
Charles W. Hosack and Lansing L. Haynes, District Judges, Presiding. 
James McMillan 
Residing at Wallace, Idaho, Attorney for Appellants/Cross-Respondents, Siegwarth 
Douglas Marfice 
Residing at Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, Attorneys for Cross-Respondents, Armands 
R. Wayne Sweney 
Residing at Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, Attorneys for Respondents/Cross-Appellants, Blanchettes and 
Schadels 
Michael K. Branstetter 
Residing at Wallace, Idaho, Attorney for Respondents/Cross-Appellants, Felsings 
John R. Zeimantz 
Residing at Spokane, Washington, Attorneys for Respondents, Opportunity Mgmt. Co., Inc. 
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I. ARGUMENT 
A. The Nature and Scope of the Access Easement Granted to Siegwarths and 
Armands was Not Based Upon Substantial and Competent Evidence. 
1. The District Judge Erred in Granting an Easement to Siegwarths and 
Armands over Lot 10. 
In opposition, Siegwarths renew their specious argument that Lot 10, BBT I, "in its 
entirety, was intended for broad recreational use incident to the Lake." Appellants' Reply Brief, 
pp. 12, 16. As pointed out in Respondents' Brief, Michael Smith's parol and impeached 
testimony upon which Siegwarths so heavily rely, is contradicted by the unambiguous 
instruments he signed. Respondents' Brief, p. 22. 
An express easement, being an interest in real property, may only be created by a written 
instrument. Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948, 951 (1976), citing Idaho Code § 
9-503. The BBT I plat did not designate the location of any easement on Lot 10, designate Lot 
IO as a recreational or common area, or dedicate Lot 10 for common use. (Ex. 79.2). Likewise, 
the Schafhausen deed did not grant an easement over Lot 10, BBT I "for access to the Lake." Ex. 
79.3. As such, any use of Lot 10, BBT I, for "for access to the Lake" was expressly limited to 
the "Lake Frontage contained in Lot 10." 
Even if the John Schafhausen deed created an easement through the "Lake Frontage" of 
Lot 10, BBT, the use of an easement claimed under a grant must be confined strictly to the 
purposes for which it was granted or reserved, and in compliance with any restrictions imposed 
by the terms of the instrument. McCoy v. McCoy, 125 Idaho 199, 868 P.2d 527 (Ct. App., 1994); 
citing 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses§ 74, pp. 479-80 (1966). The general rule 
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concerning easements is that the right of an easement holder may not be enlarged and may not 
encompass more than is necessary to fulfill the easement. Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 
119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991). In Aztec Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside Investment 
Co., this Court stated: 
"An increase in width does more than merely increase the burden upon the 
servient estate; it has the effect of enveloping additional land." Thus, the Argosy 
Trust ... could not increase the width of the easement in order to develop its land 
into a subdivision. 
100 Idaho 566, 569, 602 P .2d 64, 67 (1979). Any widening of an alleged easement on Lot 10, 
BBT I beyond the "Lake Frontage" line would impermissibly increase the burden on the servient 
estate. 
No part of Lot 10, aside from the "Lake Frontage," was or can be encumbered with an 
easement appurtenant to the Siegwarths' and Armands' properties for access to the lake. The 
language of the agreement granting use of the "Lake Frontage" in the John Schafhausen deed to 
the "other owners of lots" in BBT without reference to their successors and assigns has 
consequences. In King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 42 P.3d 698 (2002), this Court addressed the 
argument whether such language created an easement appurtenant or an easement in gross: 
The primary distinction between an easement in gross and an easement 
appurtenant is that in the latter there is, and in the former there is not, a dominant 
estate to which the easement is attached. West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 511 P.2d 
1326 (1973). An easement in gross is merely a personal interest in land of 
another, id., whereas an easement appurtenant is an interest which is annexed to 
the possession of the dominant tenement and passes with it. [citation omitted.] 
An appurtenant easement must bear some relation to the use of the dominant 
estate and is incapable of existence separate from it; any attempted severance 
from the dominant estate must fail. [citation omitted.] 
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The section of the easement agreement that is in dispute states the following: 
As partial consideration for the aforesaid easement, the grantees grant the 
grantors and their immediate families the right to use the road across the 
grantees' property described above, to reach the Spokane River for the purpose of 
fishing on the banks thereof. [Emphasis in original]. 
The district court held that this language unambiguously created an easement in 
gross that was not transferred to French. 
The opinion of the district court is correct. The first easement, which was granted 
to the Langs, clearly identified a dominant estate and a servient estate and 
identified the location of the easement. Further, the Lang easement was granted to 
the Langs and their "heirs and assigns," rather than specifically to the Lang 
family. In contrast, the easement granted to the Waggoners identified no dominant 
or servient estate, and gave a right of access to the river to people who may have 
no interest in the land itself, such as members of the Waggoners' immediate 
family. 
King, 136 Idaho at 909, 42 P.3d at 702 (Emphasis added [underlined]). 
Much like that in King, the John Schatbausen deed only granted "all other owners of lots 
in proposed Berven Bay Terrace Subdivision" the right to use "Lake Frontage" on the proposed 
Lot 10 for "access to the lake." Of import, this conveyance language does not identify any 
dominant estate benefitted by the "access to the Lake," nor did it create an easement appurtenant 
to the Siegwarths' properties. 
More recently, this Court confirmed the rule that if the language of a deed is plain and 
unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the deed itself and extrinsic 
evidence is not admissible. Machado v. Ryan, 2012 WL 2481622, 3 (June 29, 2012). As in 
Machado, the John Schatbausen deed is unambiguous as it does not allow for conflicting 
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interpretations. It simply granted "access to the Lake" at the "Lake Frontage contained in Lot 
10" and not over Lot 10. There is no language in the John Schafhausen deed that clearly 
establishes any intention to burden Lot 10, BBT I or Lot 8, BBT II, with an easement traversing 
Lot 10 to the "Lake Frontage" appurtenant to the Siegwarths' properties. For these reasons, the 
trial court's judgment establishing an easement across Lot 10, BBT I for lake access should be 
reversed. 
2. A 4' Wide Access Easement Was Not Intended by the Parties, nor is it 
Necessary for Reasonable "Lake Access." 
In the event that this Court affirms the judgment granting an express easement to 
Siegwarths and Armand, it must then address the Cross-Appeal of the trial courts' determination 
of the width and scope of the easement. The judgment described the location and scope of the 
lake access easements as follows: 
Lake Frontage Easement for Purposes of Lake Access 
An easement over said Lot 8, Berven Bay Terrace II as recorded in Book "F" of 
Plats at page 138, Kootenai County, State of Idaho, Records, along the lake 
frontage for lake access purposes, as described in the Supplemental Memorandum 
Decision, appurtenant to Lots 1-3 and 5, Berven Bay Terrace, over a strip ofland 
two (2) feet in width on each side of the centerline of the existing main path and 
extending from said centerline to the waterline of Hayden Lake with the 
description of the centerline of the main path defining the length of the easement 
described as follows: 
Lots l, 2, 3 and 5, BERVEN BAY TERRACE, Easement to Lake Frontage 
Easement for Purposes of Lake Access 
Together with an easement appurtenant to said Lots 1 and 2, Berven Bay Terrace, 
for pedestrian ingress and egress for the owners of said lots to the Lake Frontage 
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Easement, four (4) feet in width, with two (2) feet on each side for trail 
maintenance along the centerline of the existing path from Lots 1 and 2, 
BERVEN BAY TERRACE, onto Lot 8, BERVEN BAY TERRACE II described 
as follows: 
Together with an easement appurtenant to said Lots 3 and 5, BERVEN BAY 
TERRACE, for pedestrian ingress and egress for the owners of said dominant 
lots to the above-described Lake Frontage Easement, four (4) feet in width, with 
two (2) feet on each side for trail maintenance, the center line of which is to be 
determined by the Court in accordance with its Supplemental Memorandum 
Decision because the plaintiffs objected to defendants' designation of its location. 
(39445-2011 R. at 107-47). 
Siegwarths concede that a four foot wide easement granted by the trial court was not 
intended by the parties. Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 17. Rather, they contend that the granted 
easement should be at least ten feet wide because that was the width of the designated corridor 
on the Berven Bay Terrace I plat. Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 17. Siegwarths also cite to 
testimony of their surveyor, Scott Rasor, and Respondents' surveyor, Earl Sanders, regarding the 
trail width. However, the cited testimony of Mr. Rasor regarded his concerns about trail 
construction even though he acknowledged that he was not an expert in trail construction. (Tr. 
pp. 1296-1297, 1301). The Respondents' surveyor, Mr. Saunders, was merely testifying to the 
width he designated for Respondents' proposed easement that was ordered by Judge Hosack. 
(Tr. p. 1325). 
Siegwarths seek to invert the rule in Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 270, 985 P.2d 
1127, 1132 (1999) that "a grant indefinite as to width and location must impose no greater 
burden than is necessary," and argue for the most cumbersome access easement; that which 
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subsumes all of Lot 10, BBT I [Lot 8, BBT II]. Appellants' Reply Brief, pp. 16-17. As pointed 
out in Respondents' Brief, p. 41, an easement is to be defined according to the intention of the 
parties and circumstances in existence at the time the easement was given and carried out. 
Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 572, 114 P.3d 128, 130 (2005). The evidence at trial 
showed that there were no four foot wide trails established or in use on Lot 10, BBT I, when the 
property was platted. (Tr. p. 353, ls. 10-11; Tr. p. 370, L. 20-p. 371, L. 11). Due to the 
Siegwarths' failure to properly meet their burden at trial, the trial court's judgment creating a 
four foot wide easement for lake access must be reversed. 
3. An Express Reservation for a "Secondary Easement" Was Unnecessary 
and Unreasonably Increased the Burden on Servient Estate. 
In summary fashion, Siegwarths assert that the evidence shows the parties intended for a 
expansive use of Lot 10, BBT I and contend the trial court's award of a four foot secondary 
easement was justified. At no point do they address the additional burden created by enveloping 
an additional two feet ofland on each side of the easement. 
Most recently this Court reaffirmed the long standing rule that "secondary easements 
cannot enlarge the burden on the servient estate." Machado, 2012 WL 2481622 at 7; citing 
Conley, 133 Idaho at 271. Again, the evidence in the record regarding the history of trails to Lot 
10, BBT I [Lot 8, BBT II] does not show that there was any contemplation of a secondary 
easement when the John Schafhausen deed was executed, and it certainly was not mentioned in 
that document. In Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., this Court stated: 
The use to which a right of way is devoted, or for which it is created, determines 
the character oftitle with which the holder is invested. The character of the use or 
CROSS-APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 6 
the necessity of complete dominion determines the extent to which he is entitled 
to possession. No greater title or right to possession passes under a general grant 
than reasonably necessary to enable the grantee to adequately and conveniently 
make the intended use of his way. 
47 Idaho 619, 626, 277 P. 542, 544 (1929). Further, "because the determination of width and 
length of an easement must be based upon the 'circumstances in existence at the time the 
easement was given,' it follows that the width of a secondary easement must also be determined 
on that basis." Machado, 2012 WL 2481622 at 7. In Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Luna, this 
Court expressly rejected the approach taken by the trial court in specifying the dimensions of the 
declared easement without evidence of the parties' intent at the time of creation: 
While Northwest Pipeline presented evidence that a twenty-foot easement may be 
necessary for pipeline safety and maintenance under today's standards, it failed to 
present substantial evidence of the parties' intent concerning the intended width of 
the easement at the time it was granted. As plaintiff in this matter, Northwest 
Pipeline had the burden of demonstrating the intention of the parties to create a 
twenty-foot easement or that the twenty-foot easement was necessitated by 
conditions existing at the time of the grant. 
149 Idaho 772, 775, 241P.3d945, 948 (2010). 
Again, Siegwarths ignore that it was incumbent upon them to demonstrate that the parties 
intended to create a four foot secondary easement at the time the easement was created. Due to 
the complete want of evidence on this front, the court's determination oflocation and scope of 
the secondary easement cannot be sustained based upon the evidence introduced. Therefore, that 
portion of the judgment granting a specifying the width of the primary easement and a secondary 
easement must be reversed. 
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B. Siegwarths Should be Judicially Estopped from Asserting Continued Claims to 
the "Common Areas" ofBBT I Within BBT II. 
Siegwarths simply respond to Respondents' judicial estoppel argument by asserting that 
there is no inconsistency between their arbitration award compensating them for their claim on 
their title policy for their "loss" of the common areas in Berven Bay Terrace, and their argument 
on appeal that they still have an interest in the same property. Appellants' Reply Brief, pp. 18-19. 
The basis for their assertion of inconsistency is their misunderstanding of the collateral source 
rule. Because they received an arbitration award on their title policy claim for their "loss," they 
assert that this recovery from insurance proceeds is not inconsistent with continuing to assert a 
claim to the property that was compensated by the award. The collateral source rule is codified 
in Idaho Code§ 6-1606 and bars double recoveries against a defendant where an injured plaintiff 
has received compensation from insurance or some other collateral source: 
In any action for personal injury or property damage, a judgment may be 
entered for the claimant only for damages which exceed amounts received by the 
claimant from collateral sources as compensation for the personal injury or 
property damage, whether from private, group or governmental sources, and 
whether contributory or noncontributory. For the purposes of this section, 
collateral sources shall not include benefits paid under federal programs which by 
law must seek subrogation, death benefits paid under life insurance contracts, 
benefits paid by a service corporation organized under chapter 34, title 41, Idaho 
Code, and benefits paid which are recoverable under subrogation rights created 
under Idaho law or by contract. Evidence of payment by collateral sources is 
admissible to the court after the finder of fact has rendered an award. Such award 
shall be reduced by the court to the extent the award includes compensation for 
damages which have been compensated independently from collateral sources. 
(Emphasis added). 
There is no damage award in this case for the Siegwarths so the collateral source rule is 
inapplicable. 
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Judicial estoppel "precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, 
and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position," Heinze v. Bauer, 145 
Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2008), which is exactly what the Siegwarths are doing here. 
They literally want to retain their compensation award for their property "loss" and continue to 
assert that they retain an interest in the "loss" property. These are incompatible positions - loss 
and with compensation in one and retained property rights in the other. Siegwarths' actions are 
similar to the judicially estopped plaintiff in McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 154, 937 P.2d 
1222, 1228 (1997) where this Court noted: 
McKay obtained an advantage (the settlement) from one party (the medical 
malpractice defendant). She cannot now repudiate that statement made in open 
court in front of a judge, and by means of her inconsistent positions, obtain a 
recovery against another party, arising out of the same transaction. 
McKay, 130 Idaho at 154, 937 P.2d at 1228. 
Siegwarths are likewise seeking a second recovery against Respondents Schadel, 
Blanchette, and Felsing in the form of an interest in properties, the loss of which they were 
compensated for by their title insurer. As this Court stated in McKay: 
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general 
considerations of the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of 
judicial proceedings ... Judicial estoppel is intended to protect against a litigant 
playing fast and loose with the courts ... Because it is intended to protect the 
dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its 
discretion. 
McKay, 130 Idaho at 152, 937 P.2d at 1226 (1997); citing Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters 
Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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Due to the unavoidable fact that they were previously compensated for the loss of 
property rights, the Siegwarths should be judicially estopped from asserting a claim to the same 
property, the common areas ofBerven Bay Terrace I included in Berven Bay Terrace II, in this 
case. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, Respondents submit that the trial court's judgment 
granting Siegwarths an access easement over Lot 10, BBT I [Lot 8, BBT II] should be reversed 
with a remand to the District Judge directing entry of judgment that Siegwarths and Armands 
have no right, title, interest or easement to that property. In the alternative, the Respondents 
submit that the trial court's determination as to the scope of the primary and secondary was 
contrary to the evidence and law so that part of the judgment should be reversed and remanded 
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for further proceedings. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Dated: August$__, 2012. 
Dated: August/,A, 2012 
By: 
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Attorneys for Cross-Appellants 
Schadels and Blanchettes 
Attorney for Cross-Appellants Felsings 
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and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of 
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Douglas Marfice 
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Attorneys for Cross-Respondents, Armand 
James McMillan 
415 Seventh Street, Ste. 7 
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Fax: (208) 752-1900 
mcmillanlaw@suddenlinkmail.com 
Attorney for Appellants, Siegwarth 
John R. Zeimantz, Isb# 7239 
J. Patrick Diener, Isb# 8734 
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Spokane, Washington 99201 
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